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Social Science Research and Military
Agendas: Safe Distance or Bridging
a Troubling Divide?
Craig Calhoun
R ecent calls for more public social science have some-times faltered at the idea that better relations withthe military should be part of the project. Better
relations with social movements, sure. With NGOs—
why not? And certainly with the departments of state,
education, or commerce. But is it the job of academic
social scientists to inform the military?
Analyzing the disconnect, Michael Mosser focuses on
broad stylistic differences between “academics” who under-
stand themselves to be solving puzzles and “military prac-
titioners” who believe they are solving problems.1 This is
an issue, but there is plenty of problem-oriented academic
social science.2 Here I point to three further issues: First,
“military practitioners” include both line commanders and
broader strategists and policy-makers—and relations with
each have different implications (to foreshadow, Human
Terrain Systems is about the former and the Minerva Ini-
tiative is about the latter). Second, academic worry is partly
about distorted agenda-setting instead of scientific auton-
omy. And third, there is serious concern about potential
complicity in causing harm.
These issues look different to social scientists doing
different kinds of research. While any researcher may
worry that poor policy choices cause harm, model-
building specialists in international relations typically have
much less hesitation working with the military than do
ethnographers—and this has to do with the research
approaches they employ, not just their politics. The IR
specialists may simply hope their research and advice
lead to better strategy. Fieldworkers and those dependent
on context-specific relations with international col-
leagues are valued for different kinds of knowledge but
face different kinds of challenges. Likewise, the issue of
who sets the agenda looks different to area-studies spe-
cialists and fieldworkers with fewer other sources of fund-
ing. Not least, relations between the military and civilian
social scientists cannot be understood without reference
to a troubled history.
These are issues of great importance to the Social Sci-
ence Research Council (SSRC). Not least, as a leading
funder of fieldwork-based, context-specific social science
research the SSRC wants to see this both supported and
recognized for its policy and practical significance. This
work is of vital importance for those trying to shape
successful—and benign—strategies in a complex world.
But it can only thrive if there is appropriate respect for
what it takes to do this work well, and for the risks
fieldworkers sometimes face. Further, the SSRC seeks to
encourage a more public social science.3 This means
research that contributes to addressing major public prob-
lems and generates knowledge available to a wide range
of public conversations and organizations. Such knowl-
edge is an important adjunct to strong public institu-
tions that work for the benefit of all citizens. This suggests
that there should be better relationships between civilian
social scientists and the Department of Defense (DoD)—
and its analogs around the world. But such good relation-
ships depend both on building trust from experience and
building an appropriate normative framework to guide
cooperation.4 I am grateful to Perspectives in Politics for
expanding a much-needed discussion.
Good Knowledge and Uncertain
Consequences
Wanting good knowledge to bring only good results is
understandable if implausible. Nuclear weapons research
brought the issue into the public eye. Scientists who
thought the potential bad uses outweighed the good
responded both by personal decisions not to work on weap-
ons systems (and even theoretical projects relevant to
weapons systems) and by public decisions to campaign
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against nuclear weapons. But it was clear that potential
bad results were made possible precisely by good knowl-
edge: bombs based on bad physics wouldn’t explode. Social
science seldom produces such immediately devastating tech-
nologies, but nonetheless understanding social processes—
the behavior of states, the structure of populations, the
psychology of small groups—makes possible a variety of
actions that researchers may regret or condemn as well as
praise. Social scientists like physicists may respond by avoid-
ing knowledge-creation they fear will lead to bad uses or
by campaigning against such uses. But this isn’t the con-
nection between social scientists and the military that cre-
ates controversy. Controversy comes less from the study of
abstract social processes than from the study of concrete
social contexts.
Training programs for military officers and planning
efforts by the DoD are informed by the more or less gen-
eralizable results of social science. Officers are taught with-
out much controversy what states are and what kinds of
challenges they face. Individual political scientists may or
may not want to teach in military programs, but those
writing theories of the state are not dismayed when their
writings are assigned. Moreover, when academics think
the theories guiding the strategic thinking in the govern-
ment are mistaken they can contest the dominant under-
standings by deploying the usual tools of theory-production
and debate. Many prominent international relations schol-
ars did just this, for example, when neo-conservatives in
the Bush administration advocated remaking the Middle
East by a combination of military force, nation-building,
and public diplomacy.
By contrast, those with the most detailed knowledge of
actual social situations—a specialist on Shi’a communities
in Iraq, for example—may feel not only that military
decision-makers are basing policies on faulty knowledge
but also that correcting this knowledge could expose the
groups they have studied to harm. Would a better under-
standing of Shi’a politics and culture be used to subject
Shi’ites to outside control or to help them achieve greater
autonomy? What of very concrete knowledge about which
Shi’ites were sympathetic to US troops and which were
hostile? The context-specific researcher faces distinctive
challenges (whether or not this research also informs gen-
eralizations across contexts).
Just as lumping all sorts of social science research together
may reduce clarity, so it is important to distinguish pro-
viding knowledge to aid tactical operations from provid-
ing knowledge to inform strategy and policy. The Human
Terrain System (HTS) program has sought to recruit
anthropologists and other social scientists to work along-
side combat troops in real-time operations.5 The basic
notion is that contemporary combat operations, espe-
cially counterinsurgency, demand a better ability to under-
stand culture and social organization—not simply of other
combatants but of local civilian populations. Military per-
sonnel are taught to pay attention to such factors (and the
much-discussed Army and Marine Corps Counterinsur-
gency Manual 3-24 incorporated social science knowledge
to help in this). But the Human Terrain System program
also sought to incorporate social scientists into actual teams
deployed in combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan. By
contrast, the Minerva Initiative involves DoD funding for
academic research not subject to military command struc-
tures or immediate operational objectives. It was designed
to secure more knowledge to inform strategic thinking
over a longer term (not immediate tactical action).
Regarding Minerva, and military funding of academic
research more generally, questions turn on who sets the
research agenda and who frames the issues. Minerva would
not place social scientists in combat zones; it would not
classify research results or restrict publication; it would not
ask researchers to provide confidential field notes. It would
offer funds for relatively long-term research programs.When
objections surfaced to having grants directly administered
by the DoD, the National Science Foundation was com-
missioned to run the competitions for Minerva funding,
establishing an arm’s-length relationship to the DoD. But
this core issue remained: Minerva would establish priori-
ties and topics for research—for example into the impact of
religious and cultural change or what electronically avail-
able documents would reveal about strategic thinking in
China’s military. There was arguably tendentious framing
in the call for work on “terrorist organizations” that seemed
to treat terrorism as a defining attribute of some organiza-
tions rather thana tacticusedbyvariousorganizations,move-
ments, individuals, ornetworksunder certain circumstances.
But more basic was the idea that the DoD was setting the
agenda.
There was nothing new about linking calls for research
funding to national security goals. Generations of area
specialists received grants for graduate study under the
National Defense Education Act. In launching Minerva,
Secretary of Defense Gates evoked the Kennedy admin-
istration’s post-Sputnik calls for research to meet “the Rus-
sian challenge.” He quoted Arthur Schlessinger’s call for
“a return to the acceptance of eggheads and ideas.”6 What
was and is different is the direct role of the DoD in fund-
ing and setting priorities for research—rather than sup-
porting a call for other federal agencies, like those in the
Department of Education, to increase funding for such
research.7 The DoD made this move partly because it
perceived that other organizations were not funding this
research—it would not have paid for new knowledge if its
needs were already being met. But if the DoD saw its
effort as remedying a deficiency, many in the relevant aca-
demic communities saw that same deficiency as giving the
DoD undue influence. Because other agencies were not
funding fieldwork-based research, scholars would feel a
pressure to take DoD money. The result, many feared,
would be researchers harnessed to DoD framing and
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priorities—and therefore not asking critical questions, not
contesting the frames, not opening up new ways of look-
ing at contexts and issues.
Project Minerva called for culturally-oriented, context-
specific, often fieldwork-based knowledge. Senior DoD
administrators worried that the models on which they
relied missed vital dimensions of security challenges posed
today. The pursuit of national security thus needed area
studies specialists, anthropologists, sociologists, and the
kind of comparative politics specialists who learn other
languages and immerse themselves in specific sites. The
DoD had plenty of experience securing more abstract stud-
ies and no shortage of relationships to specialists in formal
modeling and game theory. Ironically, the DoD leader-
ship was calling for kinds of knowledge different from
what disciplinary hierarchies had recently rewarded most.
Its strategic thinkers saw context-specific knowledge as
crucial to formulating new strategies in relation to new
global conditions.
Researchers understandably worried not only about DoD
motives or intentions but also about the extent to which
decisions regarding what research to fund would reflect
the agendas of policy-makers rather than the judgment of
the research community. One might of course suggest that
this is the nature of research paid for by those trying to
solve specific problems. Moreover, responding to policy
agendas is not just a matter of “application”; it can have a
positive influence on basic science by leading researchers
to ask different questions.8 But it is one thing when policy
agendas structure only a fraction of the funding for a field,
or only loosely. The Minerva funding was a rare instance
of new funding for area studies and fieldwork-based social
science after at least 20 years of declining support.
This is part of a longer story than can be retold here.
It goes back to the alliance among social science, area
studies, private philanthropy, and US policy-making in
the heyday of modernization theory.9 The alliance broke
up amid critiques of prevailing development models as
well as anxieties over complicity in poorly conducted
counterinsurgency programs and the broader disputes of
the Vietnam War era (which I think Mosser’s essay under-
estimates). Area-studies fields entered a period of self-
critique that continued in some cases for decades, though
they also produced exciting new research. The end of the
Cold War encouraged many to think that market-
transition, democracy-promotion and similar global agen-
das should replace regionally focused studies of culture,
history, and social organization. In the 1990s, with the
old alliance gone, there was a crisis. Some foundations
decided they should emphasize direct engagement in prac-
tical problem-solving over research (especially academic
research). Though area studies suffered, there was for a
time a strengthening of support for “human security”
research. Issues like environmental conflicts, humanitar-
ian disasters, and the implications of HIV/AIDS and
other infectious diseases all received attention. After the
September 11 attacks, funding for security research turned
predictably to terrorism, but also returned (perhaps iron-
ically) to hard-security issues like nuclear weapons. Many
expected a revitalization of area studies funding, but this
didn’t materialize—not even for regions in which the US
launched wars.
It was in this context that, under Secretary Gates, the
DoD launched its efforts to promote the development of
cultural and social knowledge. This was occasioned by
the conviction that the nature of the wars the US mili-
tary is called on to fight is changing, and so too the
larger strategic context that will shape future conflicts.
This is why DoD leaders are trying to understand the
implications of growing Chinese power and more gener-
ally a world shaped by multiple major powers, why along-
side nation-states they are concerned with global networks
and illicit trade and with global migrations and media
systems, why they are trying to understand the role of
religion in conflicts, why they are interested in the psy-
chology and cultural contexts of suicide bombing, and
why they are interested in the dynamics of ethnic con-
flicts. DoD leaders also seek a better understanding of
the operational conditions they will face, the implica-
tions of changes in the populations recruited to the mil-
itary, of changing gender relations in the military, of the
training demands new technologies will pose, and indeed
of the ways in which support systems work—as life on
military bases poses new challenges when both parents
may potentially be deployed, or when soldiers return with
much higher incidents of post-traumatic stress disorders
than were diagnosed previously.
There are good reasons for civilians to want military
thinking—including both strategy and analysis of non-
combat operations—to be better informed. Poor intellec-
tual preparation can costs lives, prolong conflicts, and
contribute to disasters like failure to protect Iraq’s archae-
ological heritage. But of course there are risks that good
knowledge will be used to pursue bad policies more effec-
tively. In general, contesting policy seems better than with-
holding knowledge, especially in a democracy, but the
military pursuit of social science knowledge does present
some real problems.
Problems
One problem (or set of problems) derives from the fact
that the DoD now seeks input from fields that have been
underfunded in recent years. This means that there is more
anxiety because the military funding is proportionately
larger. The solution is partly support from other sources;
fields thrive better with multiple funders because this
enhances diversity of perspectives and thus creativity. Per-
haps ironically it is harder to generate positive engage-
ment from chronically underfunded fields. It is not an
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accident that the DoD leadership showed a special inter-
est in anthropology, area studies, and qualitative sociology
and comparative politics—but received a disproportion-
ate number of proposals from international relations theo-
rists, quantitative researchers, and econometricians.
A second problem is the damage done to relations
between social scientists and the military during previous
conflicts. Relations between American social scientists and
the US military and intelligence establishments were much
closer before the Vietnam War—and other offshoots of
the Cold War—became intensely controversial. They are
more distant now than relations between academic and
security counterparts in most other countries. And indeed
the distance has been institutionalized. While academic
engineers routinely work with the Defense Department,
most social scientists have little relevant experience, few
relationships, and no clear norms or best practices. More-
over, Vietnam-era protests drove ROTC programs off many
of the campuses with leading social science research depart-
ments. This reduced relationships between civilian and
military leaders. It also reinforced class divisions—as did
the end of the draft in favor of an all-volunteer military.
Elite social scientists typically have little biographical con-
tact with anyone in the military. Today’s graduate students
and junior faculty generally don’t remember the conflicts
of the 1960s and 1970s directly, but they have been trained
in settings where they are unlikely to forge connections to
the military.
The way the US military drew social scientists into
some earlier conflicts is also part of the history taught to
students in some disciplines and area studies fields. Coun-
terinsurgency programs in Central and South America and
Southeast Asia are prime examples. If there are to be bet-
ter working relationships today, this problematic history
needs to be confronted directly, not ignored or dismissed.
There is no such thing as starting fresh. And of course it is
worth noting that as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
become less popular, or when the military leadership
appears to tolerate instances of abuse of trust on the part
of military personnel, this undermines potential support
for a rapprochement between civilian researchers and the
military.
Of course there may be other problems; perhaps the
greatest arise when research is close to actual military oper-
ations, rather than insulated to some degree.
Possibilities
A new normative framework is needed to guide relation-
ships between civilian academics and the military. The
implicit normative framework in place fifty years ago was
violated by Project Camelot and similar operations and is
discredited as well as outmoded. The arguments under-
way will not be very fruitful so long as they are simply for
or against cooperation with the military or taking funding
from the military. It is important, rather, to work out a
good and open understanding of how such cooperation
might work, what risks are entailed, what are the warning
signs of problems, and what to do about them. Con-
versely, there should be an understanding of the opportu-
nities and the conditions on which those opportunities
are extended. Suspicions won’t vanish overnight. They will
be alleviated by the experience of successful collaborative
work based on mutual respect, including better under-
standing of differences of perspective.
Normative issues arise not only in direct relationships
between military funders and civilian researchers, but also
in relationships among academics. For example, what are
the appropriate obligations between advisors and graduate
students? How should military funding be considered in
tenure reviews? When a large-scale project is organized as a
consortium, how should differences among its participants
be addressed? What are the implications of Pentagon fund-
ing for efforts to build relationships with researchers in other
countries?
There are reasons to think better collaborative relation-
ships could be built. There is genuine desire among social
scientists, especially younger social scientists, to under-
take intellectual work that makes a difference to public
affairs. There is more sympathy for soldiers themselves
than there was in the Vietnam era. And here it is worth
restating that much social science research of military
relevance is neither tactical nor operational. Some of it
seeks better understanding of broad social, geopolitical,
political economic, technological, or other issues that mat-
ter to all who care about international affairs—including
the military. Some is intended to improve military oper-
ations, but not specifically or immediately combat tac-
tics. A battleship is a social organization as well as a
marine warship; how it is designed informs social pro-
cesses in ways of considerable interest. This bears on
gender, on social solidarity, and on cultural diversity as
well as on readiness to fight. It is an opportunity to
integrate design research and social science. The fraught
re-entry of veterans into civilian life is also important to
both the military and society at large. It is a matter of
job opportunities—including an unsurprising mismatch
between the places from which recruits are drawn and
the places where new jobs are created in greatest num-
bers; it is a matter of marital and family relationships,
community organization, the support of religious groups,
the effectiveness of educational opportunities and sup-
port services. To draw a line between such concerns and
civilian social science in order to preserve a pristine dis-
tance from warfare or the possible biases of military fund-
ers seems unwise.
Nonetheless, it would be foolish to ignore the genuine
risks military funding or partnerships can pose to certain
sorts of research—most especially that based on field-
work. Ironically, precisely the sort of knowledge the military
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would most like to have is the kind hardest to produce
well under military auspices. And it would be naïve to
imagine that Pentagon funding of field researchers wouldn’t
be noticed and wouldn’t cause problems for some—
including graduate students at early and vulnerable career
stages. To be sure, there are places in the world (like parts
of the former Soviet Union) where being thought to be an
agent of the military or an intelligence agency would only
make a researcher seem more important. And there are
many places where it is simply assumed that US research-
ers have links to the US military or at least US foreign
policy. But there are also places—like much of Central
and South America—where troubled experiences in the
past mean that being identified with the US military would
very often be a problem and perhaps a danger for a field-
worker today.
In Sum
There are many challenges in the way of better relation-
ships between civilian social scientists and the US mili-
tary. Some of these come from a charged history in which
civilian research—and the trust of those being studied—
has been abused. Some come from unfortunate responses
to past abuses and to an unpopular, destructive, and in
many ways futile war. Some come from a class divide
between those in many privileged institutional positions
and those joining the military. The issues are accentuated
by the role of the United States as a hegemonic global
power. It is easier for the Norwegian or Canadian military
to forge good relationships with civilian researchers; nei-
ther Norwegian nor Canadian academics are as likely to
find their international research efforts disrupted by a rep-
utation for working with the military.
At the same time, there are many reasons to bemoan
the current relationship of suspicion and distance. Per-
haps most importantly, a military that operates in seclu-
sion from civilian concerns is antithetical to democracy.
Academic social science is not as large or as basic a part of
American society as the military—for better or worse—
but if social science knowledge does not inform military
operations and strategy, or offer fully informed criticism
of it, democracy suffers, not just the military. Social sci-
entists who live in a society with a large and active mili-
tary should not proceed with their work as though it didn’t
exist. They can honorably proceed in pacifist opposition
or in opposition to specific policies—whether strategic
(like waging extensive wars in Muslim societies while try-
ing to win Muslim allies) or operational (like discrimina-
tion against homosexuals). But they cannot so honorably
simply turn the other way.
However, if social scientists are to cooperate with the
military, this needs norms and ground rules. There needs
to be clarity about the different kinds of engagements,
about the implications of different sorts of funding or
access. Rushing into relationships that have produced so
many problems in the past without exercising due dili-
gence in the present would be as unwise as refusing them.
As the military is called upon to engage not only in new
sorts of wars but in more peacekeeping missions, more
humanitarian response missions, and more work with the
militaries of other countries, it is all the more important
that there be good pathways for it to be informed by the
best available knowledge. Having the military become a
primary financer of international studies research would
be unfortunate—not necessarily because of what the mil-
itary would do with research-based knowledge but because
it would demonstrate the failure of government as a whole
(and for that matter private foundations) to provide fund-
ing commensurate with today’s global context. The pro-
duction of good knowledge demands multiple funders,
diverse agendas, and often debates over how to interpret
the results of research. It is important that social scientists
be able to make good careers and pursue vital intellectual
agendas without becoming a part of a military-academic
complex. It is important also that there be a flow of com-
munication between researchers and those responsible for
national security and engaged more broadly in trying to
achieve transnational security. It is also important to
remember that, in the end, such security is more than a
matter of state policy, for it affects the life and death of
individuals and communities.
Notes
1 Mosser 2010 uses a language of puzzles versus prob-
lems that does not clarify all the core issues. First,
“puzzle-solving” is but one mode of valued academic
achievement, though certainly prominent; there are
also major rewards for developing an integrative
explanatory model, for spotting a significant but
hitherto unnoted empirical pattern, or for disprov-
ing (or at least successfully challenging) a prominent
theory. Second, academic suspicions of “problem-
oriented” research come mainly from the notion
that the problem was specified by an outside actor
not chosen by academic researchers, and from the
notion that problem-oriented research will only
“apply” existing theory or methods rather than
improve them. What is most valued by academic
reward structures is originality, particularly original-
ity in explanatory approach (theory or method) than
can become influential in the work of others. New
empirical findings are valued less lacking such origi-
nality in explanation, or at least deployment to
challenge prevailing theories (though lots of essen-
tially descriptive empiricist work gets dressed up
with rather thin claims to theoretical or method-
ological innovation). What is not generally valued
in the academic reward system, to which Mosser
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rightly wants to call attention, is practical
usefulness.
2 Political science has of course seen recurrent debates
over just what its relationship to state power should
be. As Anderson 2003 suggests, though, even at the
height of the “behavioral revolution” and the argu-
ment that politics should be studied as abstract
science, not practical engagement, there was always a
sense in which the discipline remained oriented to
informing the state.
3 See Calhoun 2010.
4 Because of the troubled history and absent a better
normative framework for cooperation, the SSRC cur-
rently does not receive funding from the military—
even though there are issues on which we think
cooperationbetweencivilian social scientists and themil-
itary would be appropriate.
5 Mosser does not adequately distinguish informing
operations and informing strategic debates. His
comments on disputes in the American Anthropo-
logical Association focus on HTS. Anthropologists
raised concerns largely at the level of individual
researchers’ professional ethics. Anthropologists also
debated Minerva where the issues were somewhat
different. See Gusterson 2008 and the various dis-
cussions posted in 2008 and 2009 both by the AAA
and by groups like the Open Anthropology Cooper-
ative and SavageMinds.org.
6 See http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.
aspx?speechid1228.
7 Mosser notes the importance of national security
rationales for previous government funding pro-
grams like the NDEA, but does not acknowledge
the point that these were not administered by the
Department of Defense.
8 See Stokes 1997 classic account of “Pasteur’s Quadrant”.
9 See Gilman 2007.
References
Anderson, Lisa. 2003. Pursuing Truth, Exercising Power:
Social Science and Public Policy in the Twenty-first
Century. New York: Columbia University Press.
Calhoun, Craig. 2010. “Social Science for Public
Knowledge,” http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/calhoun-
social-science-for-public-knowledge/, accessed August
6, 2010.
Gilman, Nils. 2007. Mandarins of the Future. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Gusterson, Hugh. 2008. “Unveiling Minerva,” http://
essays.ssrc.org/minerva/2008/10/09/gusterson/, ac-
cessed August 6, 2010.
Mosser, Michael W. 2010. “Puzzles versus Problems:
The Alleged Disconnect between Academics and
Military Practictioners.” Perspectives on Politics 8(4):
1077–1086.
Stokes, Donald. 1997. Pasteur’s Quadrant. Washington:
Brookings Institution.
| |



Reflection Response | Puzzles versus Problems
1106 Perspectives on Politics
